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This paper proposes a new analysis of the use of bare nouns vs. indefinite NPs in 
predicative position in French. We distinguish between predicational sentences (with the 
bare noun version) and equative sentences (with the indefinite version). We argue that 
bare nouns ascribe permanent properties to aspects of entities. As for the indefinites, we 
claim that they exhibit their specific reading and introduce an individual in a new 
situation, which is identified with the referent of the subject.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is well-known that determiners in Romance languages1 are not mandatory for 
NPs in predicative position.  
 
(1) a. Jean est un enfant 
Jean is a child 
b.  Jean est enfant 
Jean is ∅ child 
 c.  Moi, je suis voiture/ salade/ mini-jupe …  
   Me, I am ∅ car/ salad/ mini-skirt … 
‘Me, I like/drive/sell… cars/ like/eat/buy… salads/  like/wear/sell… 
mini-skirts …’ 
 
Recent research on the subject has considered in particular what have been 
called ‘capacity nouns’ like avocat 'lawyer' (de Swart et al. 2007), that is to say, 
nouns which have the +[sentient] and +[institutional] features.  
 
This paper looks beyond these restrictions, since, as the examples in (1) 
suggest, other nouns which do not have these two features behave in the same 
way2. These features seem unnecessary and we argue that any noun can be used. 
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1
 The paper focuses on French. The observations and theory extend to Italian. The corresponding 
translations of (1) are: (a) Giovanni è un bambino, (b) Giovanni è bambino (c) (Io,) sono insalata.  
2
 van Peteghem 1993 and Roy 2006 already emphasize that ‘enfant’ (1b) is acceptable even if 
lacking the +[institutional] feature.  
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The paper is dedicated to spelling out the conditions of their use under the two 
variants.  
 
One of our claims is that the two variants correspond to two types of 
sentences, predicational (with the bare variant) and equatives (with the indefinite). 
In the first case, the bare noun is of type <e,t> and ascribes a property to an aspect 
of an individual; in the second case, un N, of type <e>, singles out an individual x 
which bears the description N in a new situation. We argue that sentences of the 
type Jean est N are predicational (but ascribe properties to tropes), whereas 
sentences of the type Jean est un N are equatives. This will allow us to explain 
why the indefinite version is the marked one out of context (since equatives often 
require a special context to be uttered felicitously, cf. Zamparelli 2000, Mikkelsen 
2002). It also explains why the indefinite version of (1c) provided in (1c’) is 
pragmatically weird, since it would equate a person and a car, a salad or a mini-
skirt .Only special contexts can make it felicitous and it is part of our endeavour to 
spell out which ones and the mechanisms of interpretation.   
 
(1)  c’. #Je suis une salade ! 
I am a salad!  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the main pieces 
of data and available accounts. In section 3, we present our proposal. We dedicate 
section 3.1 to bare nouns, and section 3.2 to indefinite NPs. Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. The first pieces of the problem: previous accounts and data 
 
A first idea (Strohmeyer 1907, Kupferman 1979) on the difference between the 
bare and the indefinite version is that un N describes an individual bearing the 
property introduced by the noun, whereas the bare version is a case of property 
attribution.  
 
This view has been elaborated recently by Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 
2005 in a modified claim which keeps the original distinction between two kinds 
of predication. Specifically, the relation between the bare and the indefinite one in 
predicative position has been analyzed as a relation between attributive 
predication (for the bare version) versus inclusion/classification (for the indefinite 
version).  
 
More technically, the claim goes as follows. Un enfant and ∅ enfant are of 
type <e,t>. Although they both are one place predicates, they still differ in that  ∅ 
enfant is considered a ‘qua-property’ predicate, whereas un enfant is defined as a 
‘qua-set’ predicate. This difference has a consequence in their treatment of the 
subject NP. When combined with un N, the subject is assigned the type <e>. It 
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denotes an entity which belongs to the set <e,t> denoted by un N (the reduction is 
<e>*<e,t>=t). When combined with ∅ enfant, the subject is taken to be a 
generalized quantifier of the type <<e,t>,t> (the reduction is <<e,t>,t>*<e,t>). In 
this case, the authors claim that the bare noun introduces a property localized in 
the subject. In other words, the sentence says that the property introduced by the 
bare noun is one among those of the subject NP. 
 
This view is summarized in (3a) and (3b) for (2a) and (2b), respectively, 
where D and P stand for properties, x is a variable with ranges over individuals, 
and j is an individual constant.  (2a) is states that lawyer is one of the properties of 
John, while (2b) states that Jon is a member of the set of lawyers. 
 
(2) a.  Jean est avocat 
  Jean is ∅ lawyer 
b.  ?3 Jean est un avocat 
Jean is a lawyer 
 
(3) a.  (D ∈ λP.P(j)) – The property of being a lawyer is one among the 
  properties of John 
b.  j ∈ λx D(x)) – John is an individual in the set of lawyers 
 
According to Dobrovie-Sorin and Beyssade, this explains the ce/il 
distribution. Assuming the view according to which ce cannot be shifted to denote 
properties and thus can only be of type <e>, the following contrast seems to be 
explained:  
 
(4) a.  Pierre, il est médecin 
Pierre, he is ∅ doctor 
b.  Pierre, c’est un médecin 
Pierre, ‘ce’ is a doctor 
 
This view poses both empirical and theoretical problems.  
 
2.1.1 Empirical problems 
 
The empirical adequacy of the distinction is far from clear. It has been noted since 
Strohmeyer 1907 that the indefinite article introduces a shift in the interpretation. 
Besides the classificatory use, which seems to be correctly analyzed and 
illustrated in (5), the indefinite is very commonly used in “metaphorical contexts”, 
cf. (6), or when the speaker intends to emphasize the “quality” expressed by the 
noun, cf. (7). This use has been called ‘evaluative’ (van Peteghem 1993).  
                                                          
3
 ‘?’is meant to indicate that this example is not always perfect out of the blue. We will come back 
to this issue in section 3.3.2.  
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(5) L’autruche est un oiseau  
The ostrich is a bird 
(6) Le castor est un architecte 
The beaver is an architect 
(7) Jean est un avocat ! 
John is a lawyer! 
 
Since the above mentioned account takes for granted that être un N 
expresses set membership, four points remain unexplained. 
 
1. Remarkably, the only use that is correctly grasped by the above 
mentioned analyses does not alternate with the bare version (van Peteghem 1993).  
 
(8) #L’autruche est oiseau  
The ostrich is ∅ bird 
 
2. (7) is not properly captured and the reasons for ‘emphasizing the quality’ 
deserve further investigation.  
 
3. Similarly, the above-mentioned account is also silent on the fact that the 
un N is much better accepted when it is modified.  
 
(9) ?Jean est un avocat  
Jean is a lawyer 
 
(10) Jean est un avocat qui travaille dans le troisième arrondissement  
Jean is a penal who works in the 13th urban district 
 
4. What as been called the “metaphorical” use is far from rare. In that case, 
no adjective is required to have an acceptable sentence. 
 
(11) Jean est un manager  
Jean is a manager 
(12) Jean est manager 
Jean is ∅ manager 
 
(11) can be used to metaphorically qualify the behaviour of John, whereas 
(12) entails that John is manager by profession (see de Swart et al. 2007).  
 
2.1.2 Theoretical problems 
 
On the theoretical side, there are also some issues that need further investigation.  
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Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005 argue that the indefinite and the bare 
version predicate in two different ways: attributive predication (the bare version) 
and ascribing set membership (the indefinite one).  
 
Two questions arise: Should we unify the two? And should we explicitly 
introduce type shifting for the use of un?  
 
Recent work by de Swart et al. 2007 positively answers both these questions 
and adopts a unitary view of predication as expression of set 
membership/classification.  
 
The authors claim that (2b) – which they accept as perfectly well-formed 
without any special context– expresses that ‘John is a member of the lawyer kind’, 
where the capacity noun avocat of type e is coerced into a kind (also of type e) 
and then into a set expression via application of REL (Carlson, 1977) inducing 
type shifting from kinds to entities, and which semantically corresponds to un.    
 
For (2a), they adopt a (c)overt operator CAP, obtaining (j ∈ CAP(teacher)), 
i.e. ‘John is in the set of entities which are lawyers by profession’. This is meant 
to capture sentence (13a). ‘By profession’ further turns ‘lawyer’ into the set of 
elements that are lawyers by profession, the sentence stating that John is one of 
them, cf. (13b). 
 
(13) a. John is a lawyer by profession 
b. John is in the set of professional lawyers 
 
This view introduces some new theoretical advances. In particular, it 
assumes that some hidden material plays a role, providing the ‘domain’ of 
application of the property. Nonetheless, some theoretical problems remain.  
 
The first one concerns the identification of features characterizing the nouns 
that can appear in the bare position. These authors adopt the features [+sentient], 
[+scalar] (from Matushansky and Spector 2005) and add the feature 
[+institutional]. This wrongly excludes nouns expressing age, sex, and different 
kinds of qualities from the pattern (see Strohmeyer, 1907; van Peteghem, 1993; 
Roy 2006), as well as nouns like voiture ‘car’, cf. (1c).  
 
(14) a. Jean est enfant 
Jean is ∅  child 
b.  Jean est un enfant 
John is a child 
 
(15) a.  Jeanne est garçon  
Jeanne is ∅  boy 
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b. Jeanne est un garçon !  
Jeanne is a boy! 
 
The second one concerns the characterization of the kinds of descriptions 
being made, whether they have a more permanent/definitional or a temporary 
flavour. De Swart et al.’s account is silent on this issue, which is at the core of the 
problem.  
 
Other authors (notably Matushansky and Spector 2005, following Roy 
2001) have claimed that the indefinite version would express a definitory 
property, and the bare version a temporary one4. This is supposed to explain (16). 
 
(16) Jean est danseur la nuit et enseignant le jour  
John is ∅ dancer during the night and ∅ teacher during the day 
 
Let us note from the outset that this characterization is questionable. If it can 
rule out (8), it does not explain how (6) can be obtained. Furthermore, it is not so 
clear that (16) expresses a non-permanent property (see below). 
 
Let us summarize and take stock. Like Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005, 
we assume that the bare noun is of type <e,t>, but claim that the indefinite NP is 
of type <e>. We are going to propose a different view (i) of the entity that is being 
described by the bare nouns, (ii) the constraints regulating the use of the 
indefinite, in particular (iii) provide a different account of the role of the copula 
and giving importance to a general requirement of the use of indefinites, namely, 
novelty and situational anchoring. Although proposing a different account from de 
Swart et al. 2007, we are going to build on an important insight of theirs, namely, 
that recovered material plays a role. Finally, like Matushansky and Spector 2005, 
we acknowledge the need of the scalar feature, but we do not assume as they do 
that it is compulsory and explain under which conditions the scalar interpretation 
of the noun is forced. Moreover, differently from these authors, we argue that un 
N introduces a temporary, situated property, whereas bare nouns a definitory 
property of aspects of individuals. 
 
3. A new proposal 
 
3.1 Overview of the claim 
 
The claim we argue for in the following sections is that the bare noun ascribes a 
property to an aspect of an individual, whereas the indefinite NP introduces an 
individual in a new situation.  
 
                                                          
4
 In a similar vein, Beyssade 2008 suggests in a recent work that the bare noun expresses a 
temporary phase, see below.  
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The two variants correlate with two different types of sentences: predicative 
sentences and equative ones. 
 
3.2. Analysis for the bare version 
 
In this section, we develop the proposal that bare nouns express permanent 
properties of aspects of individuals and like any other individual-level predication, 
lead to a generic reading of sentences (see Chierchia 1995).  
 
In section 3.2.1, we begin by providing some arguments for considering the 
presence of reconstructed material (following in part de Swart et al. ibid). We 
present in section 3.2.2 an informal view of aspects as tropes, followed by a more 
formal analysis of ‘NP est N’ and some predictions. We argue in section 3.2.3 in 
favour of treating bare nouns as expressing permanent properties of tropes, which 
leads to generic readings. 
 
3.2.1  First steps 
 
The first urgent question to be addressed is whether it is actually the case that 
‘some but not all’ nouns can function as bare predicates. The discussion in the 
following sections shows that this view is incorrect. Any noun can be used bare iff 
(i) it provides information which is not previously given by the subject and (ii) if 
an argument introducing a domain of application of the property denoted by the 
bare noun can be recovered5. 
                                                          
5
 A related construction in Italian sheds some light on the phenomenon at hand. The same set of 
nouns that can occupy the predicative position bare are also possible in the construction faire il N / 
'to do the' as firstly noted by Renzi and Venelli 1975.  
 
(i)  a. Giovanni fà il bambino  
Giovanni does the little boy 
b.  Giovanni fà il poliziotto 
Giovanni does the policeman  
c.  Giovanni fà la femmina / c’ ? il maschio 
Giovanni does the girl / ? the boy 
d.  Marta fà la mamma 
Marta does the mummy 
 
In all these cases, ‘fà il’ can be paraphrased as ‘plays/has the role/profession/behaves like’. 
(ii) presents the paraphrases of (i).  
 
(ii)  a. Giovanni si comporta come un bambino  
Giovanni behaves like a child 
b.  Giovanni fà il mestiere di poliziotto  
Giovanni does the job of policeman 
 c.  Giovanni si comporta come une femmina  
Giovanni behaves like a girl 
 d. Marta prende il ruolo della mamma  
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It has recently been proposed that only sortal nouns expressing (temporary) 
phases of an individual like enfant ‘child’ can function as a bare predicate 
(Beyssade 2008). This seems to explain the unacceptability of (17), since garçon 
‘boy’ is generally true of an individual all his life long. However, garçon can 
indeed function as a bare predicate, as illustrated by the acceptability of the 
attested example (18a). Similarly, (18b) is perfect, still hermaphrodite expresses a 
non-temporary property.  
 
(17) #Jean est garçon 
Jean is ∅ boy 
 
(18) a.  Quand on est garçon, on aime bien les garçons. Pour discuter, faire 
  copain (Internet) 
When one is ∅ boy, one likes boy. To discuss, make friends 
b.  Jean est hermaphrodite 
Jean is ∅ hermaphrodite 
 
Below, we show that these examples as well as others empirically illustrate 
our two claims, namely, that the bare noun (i) must give a new information with 
regard to the subject to be acceptable and (ii) describe an aspect of an individual.  
 
(i) Bringing in new information 
 
The contrast between (17) and (18a)-(18b) straightforwardly derives from our first 
claim. In (17), the proper noun Jean already indicates that the referent is a boy, 
the bare noun is unacceptable because it only provides redundant information. By 
contrast, the pronoun on being underspecified with regard to sex, garcon conveys 
new and relevant information. Similarly, (18b) is acceptable because the property 
of being an hermaphrodite is not already provided by the proper noun Jean. Let us 
now consider the following cases (note that (19a) is interpreted as ‘Jeanne 
behaves like a boy’ and (19b) is interpreted as Jeanne behaves a lot like a 
woman). 
 
(19) a.  Jean/Jeanne est garçon (de caractère/comportement)   
Jean/Jeanne is ∅  boy    
b.  Jeanne est (très) femme  
Jeanne is (very) woman 
                                                                                                                                                               
Marta plays the role of the mother (she has become a mother) 
 
For sake of precision, let us emphasize that the ‘fa il + N’ in Italian is not a paraphrase of 
the bare version in predicative position. But it sheds some light on the construction we are 
interested in here, since (a) there is an overlap between the nouns that can appear in the ‘fa il’ 
construction and bare in predicative positions; and (b) it also relies on reconstruction of hidden 
material.  
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c.  Jean est policier  
Jean is ∅ policeman 
 
When used to express the behavior of the individual, nouns like garçon 
again provide information which is not already conveyed by the subject, hence the 
acceptability of (19a).  In (19b), très (‘very’; see Kennedy and McNally 2005) has 
the effect of shifting a non-gradable predicate into a gradable one, and expresses 
that the property is verified to a high degree. Stating that Jeanne is ‘très femme’ 
cannot amount to state that she is a woman (a non-gradable property); as a 
consequence, no redundancy occurs between the subject and the bare predicate. 
However, the bare noun does not always have to be interpreted as a gradable 
predicate for the bare predication to be relevant; for instance, policier is certainly 
not necessarily interpreted as gradable in (19c). We thus disagree with 
Matushansky and Spector 2005, which states that the construction makes the 
gradable feature compulsory. 
 
The unacceptability of (8) is also easily derived the same way: the 
information of being a bird is already brought in by ostrich. The only way to save 
the example is to reinterpret oiseau as denoting the (accidental) behaviour, role, 
etc. of birds. On the other hand, the indefinite version of (6) (given in (20)) is fine, 
since being an architect characterizes the behaviour of the beaver (e.g. his skills): 
 
(20) Le castor est architecte.  
The beaver is ∅  architect 
 
(ii) Aspects 
 
What crucially counts for the use of the bare version is that there is an aspect of 
which the property is predicated. The information is thus ‘partial’ not because it 
only applies for a limited time, but because it concerns an aspect of the entity.  
 
Like de Swart et al. 2007, we assume than that some hidden material plays a 
role and agree that sentences like (21) state that the nationality of the individual at 
hand is Italian. However, according to our proposal, the task of this hidden 
material is not to shift the type of the nouns (à la de Swart et al.), but to provide 
the aspect of which the property is predicated.  
 
(21) Il est Italien  
He is ∅ Italian 
 
Our claim is then that bare nouns are predicates of aspects of individuals 
(nationality being one example of them, see below). The generalization we 
propose is given in (22).  
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(22) Generalization. When nouns are used bare in predicative position,  a 
(possibly implicit) par/de/dans NP2 provides the trope to which the 
property introduced by the bare noun applies. If NP2 denotes such a trope, 
the bare noun predication of the type ‘NP1 est N par/de/dans NP2’ 
semantically amounts to a predication of the type ‘NP2 de NP1 est N’.  
 
The generalization (22) extends that of de Swart et al. 2007 in that it does 
not restrict the set of nouns by the +[institutional] feature, but allows any noun 
expressing a property that can be restricted by a de/par/dans modifier denoting a 
trope of the subject, that is virtually every noun. Some predictions derived from 
(22) are provided in the next section. 
 
In the same vein, the account extends the coverage well beyond the 
+[scalar] and +[sentient] as proposed by Matushansky and Spector. Productive 
examples such as those cited in (1c) are captured as acceptable. Our analysis is 
given in the next section.  
 
3.2.2  Aspects as tropes and tropes as accidents 
 
Recent debate in the philosophical and linguistic literature has understood aspects 
in various ways. One of the views, which traces back to Aristotle, Category I, 
treats aspects of individuals as particulars, which ontologically depend on that 
individual. ‘The character of John’, the ‘nationality of John’ and so on are 
examples of them. There are some points of disagreement about which individuals 
count as tropes. Some theoreticians consider that tropes are abstract (e.g. 
Campbell, 1990), others define them as concrete individuals (e.g. Simons, 1994). 
All seem to agree on two issues:  
 
(i) Tropes are dependent particulars, in the sense that they ontologically 
depend on another individual. So are accidents à la Aristotle. 
(ii) Eventualities are tropes (eventualities cannot exist without their 
participants to exist). 
 
Since eventualities have already a name in linguistics, we will restrict here 
the use of the term ‘trope’ to denote, within the class of dependent particulars, the 
complement set of the set of eventualities. In other words, ‘tropes’ will be used to 
denote dependent particulars which are not eventualities. We do not commit as to 
whether they are abstract or concrete.  
 
We suggest that predication with bare nouns amounts to property ascription 
to tropes under this definition; the bare noun is of type <e,t> and ascribes a 
property to a trope. Following (22), sentences (23a-24a) paraphrase as (23b-24b). 
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(23) a.  John est avocat  
John is ∅ lawyer 
b.  La profession de John est avocat  
The profession of John is ∅ lawyer 
 
(24) a.  Jean est italien  
Jean is ∅ Italian 
b.  La nationalité de Jean est italienne 
The nationality of John is Italian 
 
In (23), avocat bears the type <e,t>, the copula has no effect, and being a 
particularized individual ,‘the profession of John’ bears the type <e>. 
 
Differently from what is stated in Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005, 
individuals are not analyzed here as properties of properties among which that 
expressed by the bare noun. The account we propose keeps the representation of 
individuals uniform, namely of type <e> (see section that follows for the analysis 
of the indefinite version). The cost of this claim is, of course, that we have to 
accommodate covert material, and coerce “Jean” into “a ‘trope’ of Jean”. The bare 
noun characterizes this particular (also of type <e>). However, we agree with 
Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin that the bare version ascribes a property and does 
not express set membership. 
 
Like de Swart et al. 2007, we assume that (23) implicates that John is 
among the lawyers by profession, but this is not the primary meaning of the 
sentence: it firstly qualifies its profession (not John). Moreover, although our 
analysis requires some hidden material like theirs, it does not involve type 
shifting, but only that hidden material be accommodated in subject position. 
Finally, it also has the advantage of covering a larger set of data, without a 
restriction to +[institutional] nouns. Before deriving its predictions, we present 
our analysis more formally. 
 
As often emphasized by trope theorists, there is no closed set of particulars 
to be attributed to an individual.  
 
Let I be the set of individuals, X the set of tropes and ‘of’ the abstract part of 
relation. (25) states that for every individual, the set of its tropes is not empty. (26) 
presents the semantics for the interpretation of predicative sentences with bare 
nouns.  
 
(25) ∀Y ∈ X  ∀i ∈ I (∃y ∈ (Y of i)) 
(26) The semantics of the bare version:   NP is N iff  λP. λy (P(y)) 
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A first prediction of the analysis is  that NPs like la profession de Pierre 'the 
profession of Pierre' which 'openly' denote tropes are acceptable with the bare 
noun version, but not with the indefinite one, cf. (23b) versus (23c). Note that 
(23c) funnily suggests that the trope of Pierre is a 'real' individual (“shall we invite 
the profession of Pierre for dinner today?”), which is explained if, as we propose 
below, the indefinite version introduces an individual and equates it with the 
referent of the subject: 
 
(23) b. OK La profession de Pierre est avocat. 
The profession of Pierre is ∅ lawyer 
(23) c.  # La profession de Pierre est un avocat. 
  The profession of Pierre is a lawyer 
 
Note that contrary to what happens in “classical” cases of coercion (John 
begins the book / John begins reading the book), the version explicitly giving the 
output of the coercion process (that is, the paraphrase with a subject overtly 
denoting a trope) might sometimes sound somewhat unnatural. But we believe 
that if this is the case, it is due to the fact that we are not as used to talk overtly 
about tropes as we are about persons, things or events. A common strategy is to 
use nouns like Jean to describe a trope of Jean, as everybody understands the 
speaker's intention. 
 
 A second prediction is that the kind of paraphrase illustrated in (23a)-(23b) 
is not available when the de/dans/par modifier does not denote a trope of the 
subject. For instance, (27b) – which is unacceptable -- does not paraphrase (27a), 
because la naissance de Pierre ‘the birth of Pierre’ does not express a trope of 
Pierre, but rather an event involving him. Similarly, (28a) is not equivalent to 
(28b), because la mère de Pierre does not denote a trope of Jean, but rather an 
individual linked to him: 
 
(27) a.  Pierre est italien de naissance. 
Pierre is Italian by birth 
b. #La naissance de Pierre est italienne  
The birth of Pierre is Italian 
(28) a.  Jean est aveugle par sa mère. 
Jean is blind because of his mother 
b.  La mère de Jean est aveugle. 
  Jean’s mother is blind 
 
3.2.3 The bare noun ascribes generic properties 
 
Authors agree on some facts about the phenomenology of generic properties: (i) 
they do not need to be instantiated, cf. (29a); (ii) they can be bound in time, cf. 
Bare and indefinite NPs in predicative position in French 
 
 
 131
(29b). Overall, definitory properties are taken to introduce a generic operator 
GEN and give rise to a generic interpretation of sentences. 
 
(29) a.  This machine crushes oranges. 
b.  When he was a little boy, my son was very talkative 
 
These two characteristics are met by bare noun predication. Contra Roy 
2006, we assume that (30a) is perfectly acceptable (as well as its indefinite 
version). Note that (30b) is used to mean that my daughter used to wear mini-
skirts when she was a teenager. 
 
(30) a. Pierre est avocat mais il n’a jamais pratiqué  
Pierre is ∅ lawyer, but he never practised. 
b.  Quand elle était adolescente, ma fille était mini-jupe 
  When she was a teenager, my daughter was ∅ mini-skirt 
 
(31) has been frequently used to argue that bare nouns introduce temporary 
properties. This interpretation of the data does not seem to be correct. If John 
smokes after dinner, he is not said to have a temporary property, but a property 
that occurs at particular occasions. In other words, as often argued, the generic 
reading is obtained in these cases and is driven by quantifying over situations (the 
days and the nights) and not over individuals (Krifka 1995, a.o.). 
 
(31) Jean est danseur la nuit et enseignant le jour  (= (16)) 
John is ∅ dancer during the night and ∅ teacher during the day 
 
Thirdly, bare nouns are not accepted in real episodic sentences. For 
instance, (32) is acceptable only on its inchoative reading under which it 
expresses the beginning of a permanent property. 
 
(32) #This morning, Pierre est avocat. 
This morning, Pierre is ∅ lawyer 
 
On the contrary, the indefinite version of (32) is acceptable under the 
metaphorical reading (Pierre is behaving this morning like a lawyer).  
 
Summarizing. We have endorsed the claim that bare nouns lead to 
predicational sentences. We have shown that (1) some hidden material must be 
recovered, but that this does not introduce any type shifting, (2) the predication is 
‘partial’ in that it  concerns an aspect, (3) the predication is not temporary and 
leads to generic reading. Related to this third claim, we have shown that (3’) any 
noun can be used, provided it brings in new information that is attached to an 
aspect of an individual.  
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In the next section we consider the conditions of use of the indefinite 
version, and also come back to a comparison with the use of the bare one.  
 
3.3 The conditions of use of the indefinite version 
 
3.3.1 The claim 
 
We claim that in predicative position, un N denotes an individual (is of type <e>) 
and argue for two points.  
 
(i) Situational dependence of un N. Firstly, we claim that to be appropriate, the 
indefinite un N receives its specific reading and singularizes an individual x under 
the guise N in a new situation.   
 
(33) Situational dependence of Un N: un N denotes an individual under the 
property N felicitously iff there is an element in the sentence anchoring the 
individual x and the property N in a new situation s.  
 
Basically, in saying that un N denotes an individual x in a new situation s, 
(33) only reformulates the Condition of Novelty traditionally attached to 
indefinites since Heim 1982.  
 
On the other hand, the claim that the attribution of the property N denoted 
by the noun is also anchored in a situation is maybe less traditional. It amounts to 
saying that the individual only has to verify the property N in s in order for the 
predication to be fulfilled. The predication provided by un N is in this sense 
“temporally weak”. However, this of course does not impede one from using un N 
to make a stronger claim. The point is that it is not made compulsory by un N 
itself. 
 
 In claiming that un is also attached to the Condition of Novelty in the 
position under study, we offer a more unitary view of this indefinite. We are also 
in line with numerous studies having assumed that anchoring in a particular 
situation is a general requirement for the existential un/des. For instance, 
Dobrovie-Sorin 1997 claimed that un/des require “presentational predicates” to be 
acceptable in subject and object position. 
 
(ii) Equative sentences. Secondly, while Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin assume 
like other authors that sentences of the type “NP est un N” are predicational, we 
suggest below that these sentences are true equatives, and as such assert the 
identity between the denotation of the subject and the denotation of the post-
copular NP. Mary is Dr Smith is a paradigmatical example of equative sentences 
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making an identity statement.6 Among authors recognizing the existence of true 
equative copular sentences, some of them (e.g. Heycock and Kroch, 1997) keep 
the semantics of the copula uniform and assign different types of small clauses to 
predicational and equative copular sentences. Others capture the difference in 
positing an ambiguous copula, the equative sentences being built with a ‘BE of 
identity’. This is the option taken by Heller 1999, who provides empirical 
evidence in Hebrew for positing two different be. Here, we will also derive 
equation semantics by using a be of identity, but we believe that our account 
could also be translated in an account à la Heycock and Kroch, where the copula 
is taken to be unambiguous. 
 
In sum, sentences like “NP est un N” are analysed here as asserting the 
identity between two individuals, the second one being anchored in a particular 
situation. (34) summarizes this view (Nin s symbolises the property N relativised to 
the situation s). The specific reading of the indefinite is translated with the help of 
choice functions. Let us f be  a choice function (among others): 
 
(34) a.  Le boulanger est un manager ! 
The baker is a manager! 
 b.  [The baker]: ι x Baker(x)  
 c.  [be]: ‘=’ 
 d.  [a manager]: f(Manager
 in s) 
 e.  [The baker is a manager]= ι x Baker(x)  = f(Manager
 in s) 
 
It is worth noting that in English, due to the lack of a/bare alternation in 
predicative position, sentences like John is a teacher (in English!) have been 
generally classified as predicational. Our (maybe somewhat provocative) claim is 
that in French, the two variants correspond to predicative sentences (variants 
selected with bare nouns) and equative ones, the latter being selected with the 
indefinite version.  
 
Besides the number of predictions that this analysis derives despite its 
apparent unorthodox character, one of the arguments for adopting the equative 
analysis comes from the impossibility of having the pronouns il/elle ‘he/she’ in 
the subject position, a robust fact which has often been acknowledged in previous 
literature (Kupferman 1979; Laca and Tasmowski, 1994; Dobrovie-Sorin and 
Beyssade 2005 a.o.). Generally, this fact is explained with the generalization that 
ce is specialized for expressing set membership7.  
 
                                                          
6
 Following e.g. Higgins 1973, we discriminate between true equative sentences (or identity 
sentences) and specificational ones. One argument in favor of maintaining the difference is that the 
subject of the first is referential, which the one of the latter is non-referential (see e.g. Mikkelsen 
2002). On the contrary, Heycock and Kroch consider that equative sentences are specificational.  
7
 Recall that most of these theories consider that un NP leads to classificatory predication.  
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(35) #Il est un médecin 
He is a doctor 
 
We suggest that the problem of (35) comes from a pragmatical constraint 
we propose to attach to equative sentences, namely that the discourse referents of 
the two identified NPs must roughly have the same “discursive weight”. In the 
canonical true equative sentences (Mary is Doctor Smith), they are supposed to be 
both known to the hearer (Zamparelli 2000). In the sentences under study here, 
they both must introduce a new individual. Being an anaphorical pronoun, il is 
‘discursively too heavy’ for its discourse referent to be equate with the one of the 
indefinite in an equative sentence. Remarkably, as we will see below, other 
pronouns like je ‘I’ and tu ‘you’ are perfectly acceptable in sentences like (35), 
which is unsurprising given our claim: since they are deictic pronouns, they can 
introduce new individuals in the discourse and have the same discursive weight as 
indefinites. 
 
Before showing how the analysis accounts for the distribution of the 
indefinite in predicative position and the differences with the corresponding bare 
noun version (section 3.3.4), we review the main interpretations attributed to 
predicative sentences built with un N (section 3.3.2), and show that the contrast 
we assume between N and un N is independently displayed in other constructions 
(section 3.3.3). 
 
3.3.2 Two different interpretations 
 
A sentence like (36) has been said to make two different kinds of ascriptions.  
 
(36) Pierre est un enseignant  
Pierre is a teacher 
 
Under the first reading, (36) is said to make an ‘identificational statement' 
(Van Peteghem 1993, Roy 2006): it identifies an individual, typically as an 
answer to a wh-question: qui est Pierre? (Who is Peter?). Identificational 
statements are felt as expressing definitory properties. If one presents Peter as a 
teacher, it means that Peter is a teacher. Note that equative sentences are precisely 
supposed to make ‘identificational statements’. 
 
Under the second reading, corresponding to the ‘metaphorical reading’ or to 
the ‘evaluative’ one, (36) attributes what is considered to be a temporary property 
(Strohmeyer 1907, Van Peteghem 1993). (36) can then be used in a context where 
Pierre is behaving on one occasion like a teacher but is not one by profession. 
This is also the kind of metaphorical reading that makes sentences like (1c’) 
felicitous.  
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These two readings have either been treated apart or the second have been 
reduced to the first. Some authors (e.g. Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005) have 
in fact argued that the first reading corresponds to (i) the expression of set 
membership and (ii) to the ascription of a definitory property. They have treated 
the second set of readings (metaphorical and evaluative) as marginal. Other 
authors have stated that the un N expresses set membership under no matter which 
of these two readings (e.g. de Swart et al. 2007). In what follows, we argue that 
the metaphorical and evaluative readings are to be taken seriously and propose a 
unitary view of the identificational and metaphorical/evaluative interpretations. 
 
Before going to the theoretical side, it might be useful to come back to the 
empirical description of these two interpretations, which is to our view not 
entirely complete. Firstly, it has been left unnoticed that a sentence like (36) is the 
marked one compared to its bare version. In fact, native subjects are often 
reluctant to attribute themselves (36) out of the blue. This dispreference is left 
unexplained by previous accounts. On the contrary, it is expected if these 
sentences are equative ones, since equatives often require a special context to be 
uttered felicitously (cf. Zamparelli 2000, Mikkelsen 2002). Another important fact 
which deserves more attention is that it is not true that (36) is felt as acceptable in 
any description of a definitory property. What is crucial is precisely filled 
(although accidentally) by the who-test, namely that the (identificational) 
statement is a presentational one: the individual is introduced for the first time 
under the guise offered by the noun in a specific situation. This is very often this 
kind of presentational contexts that native speakers evoke to make a sentence like 
(36) perfectly natural. Another context often evoked is a “justificational” one, 
where, typically, the speaker feels obliged to reintroduce himself under the 
relevant guise to the addressee which acts as if he ignores it (Dites! Je suis un 
enseignant moi chère amie! 'What do you think?! I'm a teacher, dear friend!'). 
Crucially again, this context anchors the predication in a particular situation, and 
presents the individual as newly introduced under this guise (since the hearer 
feigns to ignore it). 
 
We claim that the two acknowledged readings correspond to two different 
ways to satisfy the situation dependence of un N (cf. (33)): in the presentational 
reading, the presentational game provides the needed situation (x is equated with y 
in a particular situation, namely the presentation), and in the metaphorical or 
evaluative reading, it is provided by the behaviour witnessed by the speaker and 
underlying his metaphor or evaluation (x is equated with y in a particular situation, 
namely the one displayed by x).  
 
3.3.3  un/des N versus N in other constructions 
 
There are at least two other constructions where un N and its plural version des N 
alternate with N in French, namely averbal sentences and appositives. A first 
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relevant observation is that the indefinite is compulsory in exclamative averbal 
sentences, while it is generally optional in assertive ones: 
 
(37) Oh! Une maison avec jardin!  Oh! Des caisses! 
Oh! A house with garden!  Oh! 'des' boxes! 
(38) #Oh! Maison avec jardin!  #Oh! Caisses! 
Oh! House with garden!  Oh! Boxes! 
(39) Nous prîmes la rue à gauche. Une maison avec jardin/ Des maisons 
 partout 
We took the street to the left. A house with garden/'des' houses  everywhere 
(40) Nous prîmes la rue à gauche. Maison avec jardin/ Maisons partout 
We took the street to the left. House with garden/Houses everywhere 
 
Exclamative averbal sentences provide exactly the context required by un 
N/des N: they are used to introduce individuals (under a new guise N) anchored in 
a new situation. The acceptability of (37) is thus not surprising, since the job of un 
N/des N is to introduce individuals in such contexts. On the other hand, (38) is out 
because the bare noun only predicate a property of an individual and thus cannot 
be used by itself as an individual-introducer.8   
 
Assertive averbal sentences can also be used to introduce individuals. This is 
what happens when they are understood as a perception report of an implicit 
observer describing what he has in front of him, as in (39). But as they do not 
have a deictic value as exclamatives, assertive averbal sentences can also be used 
to qualify individuals without introducing them, cf. (40). This pure descriptive use 
is not felicitous with un/des N, as illustrated by the contrast below: 
 
(41) [written on a box] Lampe(s) 
(42) [same context] #Une lampe/#Des lampes 
  
 Describing the content of a box with un N/des N as in (42) triggers a weird 
discursive effect: what should be a pure description of the box content is oddly 
presented as a perception report of somebody describing is in front of him. 
Appositives display the same kind of contrast: 
 
(43) [in a newspaper] Pierre Dargaud, un avocat fiscaliste, déclare avoir vu le
 suspect prendre l'ascenseur à minuit. 
Pierre Dargaud, a penal lawyer, declared having seen the suspect taking 
theelevator at midnight. 
 
                                                          
8
 Note that this is in line with the hypothesis of Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005, as well as the 
one of van Geenhoven 1998 and McNally & van Geenhoven 1997 according to which bare 
indefinites only predicate a property of an individual which is existentially quantified by the verb 
itself. 
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(44) [in a internal report of a company employing P. Dargaud for a long time] 
 #Pierre Dargaud, un avocat fiscaliste, prend en charge les prochains dossiers  
liés au projet A. 17. 
 Pierre Dargaud, a penal lawyer, takes care of the next dossiers linked to 
 the project A. 17 
 
Un N is fine in (43) because the indefinite is naturally used as an individual 
introducer. But this use is inappropriate in a context as (44) where the existence of 
the individual is already taken for granted by any reader of the report; only its 
qualification under a certain guise is relevant. 
 
3.3.4 un N in predicative constructions 
 
Let us see now what are the predictions of the analysis with regard to être un N 
constructions. The first one is that un N requires to be acceptable that the 
indefinite is anchored in a particular situation. Our predictions are the following.  
 
(i) Anchoring the indefinite. They are at least five ways to anchor the indefinite, 
respectively illustrated by the following examples:  
 
(45) Bonjour, je m'appelle Pierre Dargaud. Je suis un avocat fiscaliste 
 Hello, my name is Pierre Dargaud. I'm a penal lawyer 
(46) Mais! Pierre un médecin! 
 But Pierre is a doctor! 
(47) Dans cette scène, Pierre est un médecin. 
 In this scene, Pierre is a doctor 
(48) Pierre est un assassin 
 Pierre is a murderer 
(49) Jean est un avocat qui travaille dans le troisième arrondissement (= (10)) 
 Jean is a lawyer who works in the 13th urban district 
 
In (45), the situation is provided by the presentational context. In (46) where 
the construction has its metaphorical reading (it is typically uttered about an 
addressee which is not a status of doctor), the situation is provided by the doctor-
like behaviour of Pierre. Note that in analyzing (46) as meaning Pierre equates a 
doctor in a particular situation, we can account for the fact that there is no 
entailment from (46) to the proposition Doctor(Pierre). Indeed, there is no 
entailment from (50a) (our logical form of (46)) to (50b), since there is no 
entailment between “be a doctor in a particular situation” and “be a doctor”. For 
an individual x:  
 
(50) a.  Pierre(x) = f(Doctorin s)  
b.  Pierre(x) & Doctor(Pierre) 
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In (47), the needed situation is provided by the frame-setting modifier (as 
defined by Maienborn 2001). In (48), the meaning of noun itself provides the 
required situation: necessarily, being a murderer is being a murderer in a 
particular situation. Indeed, the ascription of the property denoted by assassin is 
felicitous only in cases where a murder has effectively occurred, i.e. if there is a 
situation (of murder) that justifies the ascription of the relevant property.  
Finally, in (49), the situational anchoring is ensured by the modifiers. If the 
un N version is better with such modifiers, it is because they precisely help to 
fulfil the situation dependence of the indefinite version9.  
 
(ii) Short-term/long-term properties. A second good prediction of the analysis 
is that un N will not be felicitous when an adverbial makes clear that the property 
denoted by N is a permanent one, and when no element allows to relativize this 
property to a situation. For instance, (51) is clearly unacceptable, except if a 
frame-setting modifier like sur scène 'on scene' is implicitly interpreted ((50) then 
means that I play the role of an computer specialist on scene since 50 years --- but 
no long-term property is then predicated of me anymore). This constraint is also at 
play in appositives, cf. (52) (compared to (43)): 
 
(51) #Je suis un informaticien depuis 50 ans. 
 I'm a computer specialist since 50 years. 
(52) #Pierre Dargaud, un avocat pénaliste depuis 30 ans, a déclaré avoir vu le 
 suspect prendre l'ascenseur. 
Pierre Dargaud, a penal lawyer since 30 years, declared having seen the 
 suspect taking the elevator. 
 
A related prediction is that un will be compulsory when N denotes a short-
term property. For instance, (54) is unacceptable, except on the marked reading 
where being a lawyer passing through Paris is reinterpreted as a permanent 
property (see also example (32) above): 
 
(53) Pierre est un avocat de passage à Paris. 
Pierre is a lawyer visiting Paris 
 
(54) #Pierre est avocat de passage à Paris 
 Pierre is ∅ lawyer visiting Paris 
 
(iii) Ce constructions. Ce constructions have been largely discussed by 
Kupferman 1979, Cadiot 1988, Carlier 1996. They work particularly well with un 
                                                          
9
 It can also be that the as what commonly happens elsewhere, the modifiers help the indefinite to 
get the specific reading, which is the reading needed for the sentence to equate two (specific) 
individuals. For instance, such modifiers also help the indefinite to get wide scope in an if-clause, 
cf. e.g. Geurts 2005. 
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N in predicative constructions (cf. (55)), and this preference should be accounted 
for. 
 
(55) Pierre, c'est un ange. 
 Pierre, ce is an angel. 
 
 All quoted authors note that ce tends to “desindividualize” the individual. 
Carlier suggests that it “dereferentializes” it. Cadiot claims that it “does not 
exactly refers to its antecedent, but, exactly, to what the speaker does with it. It 
treats the object not as a 'real thing', individualized, autonomous, but like a 
support for his own experience” (pp. 177-178, our translation).  
 
One way to capture this effect without giving up the traditional claim that ce 
is a referential expression is to assume that ce refers to individuals only as 
ingredients of situation, entities that we could call “thetic individuals”. In other 
words, the individual referred to is reduced to a simple component of a larger 
situation. 
 
 Let us now see how ce distributes with un N through the following minimal 
pairs. Note that the acceptability of (56) incidentally argues against previous 
accounts like Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005, which predict this example as 
unacceptable, assuming that ce perfectly correlates with the indefinite version: 
 
(56) Pierre, c'est une femme. 
Pierre, ‘ce’ is a woman 
(57) *Ces talons aiguilles, c'est une femme. 
These spike heels, 'ce' is a woman. 
(58) *Pierre, c'est femme. 
Pierre, 'ce' is ∅ woman 
(59) Ces talons aiguilles, c'est femme. 
 These spike heels, 'ce' is ∅ woman 
 
 According to the proposed analysis, (56) asserts that an identity between 
two individuals, the first one being Pierre and referred to by ce in the context of 
utterance and the second one being introduced by une femme. As ce forces by 
itself to view the individual as a part of a situation (cf. above), it fulfils the 
situational requirement imposed by un N. The fact that (56) does not require 
special contexts as before to be acceptable (presentational contexts, justificational 
ones, metaphorical reading, modifiers etc.) is thus explained, as well as, more 
generally, the fact that ce constructions suit well un N in predicative position. The 
unacceptability of (57) is also easily accounted for, since there is no way to 
identify a pair of spike heels with a woman.   
On the contrary, (59) is accepted since it asserts a permanent property of an 
aspect of kneels (e.g. their appearance). Finally, (58) is impossible since it is very 
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difficult to recover the existence of a permanent property of Pierre only conceived 
as an ingredient of a particular situation.  
 
(iv) Pronominal subjects. As already mentioned, un N in predicative position is 
especially bad when the pronouns il/elle 'he/she' are in subject position. This is 
true even in the particular contexts normally increasing the acceptability of un N. 
Quite intriguingly, the other personal pronouns je 'I' and tu 'you' do not raise this 
additional problem, and il/elle are fine with a post-copular definite description, cf. 
(62). 
 
(60) #Il est un avocat 
 He is a lawyer 
(61) Je suis/ tu es un avocat 
 I am/ you are a lawyer 
(62) Il est l’avocat 
 He is the lawyer 
(63) Pierre est un avocat ! 
Pierre is a lawyer 
 
As already suggested in section 3.3.1, we propose to account for this 
distribution in positing that the two NPs of equative sentences must roughly have 
the same discursive weight. This is straightforwardly the case for paradigmatical 
equative sentences like Hesperus is Phosphorus. Being deictic expressions, ce, je 
and tu introduce new individuals like indefinites. The constraint is then respected. 
Being anaphorical expressions, il/elle present their referents as known by the 
hearer. As the indefinite introduces a new individual, the equation cannot go 
through while respecting the proposed pragmatical rule. But (62) is fine as an 
equative sentence because it identifies two referents which are known to the 
hearer. However, definite descriptions arguably can also be used to introduce a 
new individual. Indeed, some authors have independently suggested that the 
Condition of Familiarity normally attached to definite descriptions can be 
suspended (cf. e.g. Kleiber 1981:226, Poesio 1994). As they are also able to 
introduce a new individual, they are thus fine too in subject position with un N in 
post-copular position. Finally, if (63) is fine, it is because proper names can also 
be used to describe individuals not known to the hearer: it can be that the hearer of 
(63) only knows the name Jean, but not its referent, and proper names are often 
used in presentational contexts where the individual is introduced to the hearer for 
the first time (Corblin 2005).    
 
(v) The distribution of ‘personne’ (nobody). As often noticed, ‘personne’ 
cannot be used with the indefinite variant (see Roy 2006). Out account 
straightforwardly explains this by the fact that ‘personne’ is not referential (see 
e.g. Tasmowski and Verluyten 1982), and thus cannot provide an entity for the 
equation to go through.  
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(64) a.  Personne n’est avocat 
Nobody is ∅ lawyer 
b.  *Personne n’est un avocat 
Nobody is a lawyer 
 
4. Conclusions and remaining problems 
 
In this paper, we have argued that the bare/indefinite alternation in predicative 
position corresponds to two different kind of sentences: the bare version induces a 
predicational interpretation, whereas the indefinite version triggers an equative 
one. In delineating more precisely the difference between bare nouns and 
indefinites un N, it contributes to a more fine-grained typology of weak indefinites 
(since bare nouns and NPs built with a weak determiner are often treated on a 
par). 
 
 Besides introducing equative sentences, our analysis of the indefinite 
version heavily relies on two requirements, the first being classically attached to 
indefinites: the Novelty Condition and the anchoring to a situation. The analysis 
of the bare version, on the other hand, reinterprets in a new light the role of hidden 
material, already used in de Swart et al. 2007.  
 
 Some problems remain though. The first one is that traditionally, equative 
sentences are supposed to allow the permutation of the two NPs (Dr Smith is 
Mary is as fine as Mary is Dr Smith). However, this is not the case with sentences 
of the type “NP est un N”, cf. (65). The only way to recover the full acceptability 
is to introduce a modal verb like pouvoir ‘can’ or devoir ‘must’, cf. (66).  
 
(65) #Un avocat du troisième arrondissement est Pierre. 
  A lawyer of the third district is Pierre  
(66) Un avocat du troisième arrondissement peut/doit être Pierre. 
A lawyer of the third district can/must be Pierre 
 
 However, we do not believe that the unacceptability of sentences like (65) 
completely undermines the equative analysis. It can well be that even if they have 
the same discursive weight, the two NPs still differ pragmatically in other 
respects, and that indefinite NPs cannot fulfill the pragmatic properties attached to 
the subject of equative sentences. These properties remain to be investigated 
though for the account to be complete.  
 
 Another intriguing set of data which could at first sight cast some doubt on 
the proposed analysis is illustrated by the contrast (67)-(69) below. Note that 
avocate is the feminine version of avocat. As shown in (67), it can be used when 
applied to women, although the masculine version is also commonly used in this 
case: 
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(67) Jeanne est avocate (OK avocat)  
Jeanne is lawyer-FEM. (lawyer-MASC.) 
(68) La profession de Jeanne est avocat.  
  The profession of Jeanne is lawyer-MASC. 
(69) #La profession de Pierre est avocate 
  The profession of Jeanne is lawyer-FEM. 
 
  Why is the feminine version suddenly unavailable when the subject 
explicitly refers to the trope, if, as we suggest, (68) is a paraphrase of (67)? 
Interestingly, this contrast only displays with nouns of profession. For instance, 
with a noun like adolescent, the feminine is compulsory with a (feminine) subject 
overtly denoting a trope, as well as with a subject denoting an individual: 
 
(70) Jeanne est adolescente (*adolescent)  
  Jeanne is teenager-FEM. (teenager-MASC.) 
(71) L’attitude de Jeanne est adolescente (*adolescent) 
  The attitude of Jeanne is teenager-FEM. (teenager-MASC.) 
 
  Our explanation of these facts is the following. Firstly, we assume that the 
coercion mechanism intervenes after the attribution of morphological features. 
More concretely, Jeanne is reinterpreted as La profession de Jeanne in (67) only 
after the morphology feature [+FEM] has been attributed to the bare predicate. This 
explains why avocate is grammatical in (67) (although it is not in (69)). Secondly, 
we explain the agrammaticality of (69) as follows. The introduction of the 
feminine version of names of profession in the French lexicon is a relatively new 
fact. Not so long ago, the masculine version was indifferently applied to men and 
women. This usage is actually still ongoing, as (67) shows. The proposed idea is 
that the feminine version of names of professions is too recent to be productive 
enough to apply to other types of entities than the ones for which they were 
created, namely persons. In other words, the unacceptability of (69) is a sign that 
the feminine version of French profession names is not yet part of a fully 
productive French. On the other hand, the feminine version of names as 
adolescent existing since a very long time, it can apply to any type of entities 
without any difficulty. 
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